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tool might return a spurious counterexample. Under such conditions, we perform counterexample-guided
refinement to adjust the approximation, and then repeat the process. Our approach is orthogonal to, and
can be integrated with, many existing verification techniques. For evaluation purposes, we integrate it with
the recently proposed Marabou framework, and observe a significant improvement in Marabou’s
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Abstract. Deep neural networks are increasingly being used as controllers for safety-critical systems. Because neural networks are opaque,
certifying their correctness is a signiﬁcant challenge. To address this issue,
several neural network veriﬁcation approaches have recently been proposed. However, these approaches aﬀord limited scalability, and applying
them to large networks can be challenging. In this paper, we propose a
framework that can enhance neural network veriﬁcation techniques by
using over-approximation to reduce the size of the network—thus making it more amenable to veriﬁcation. We perform the approximation such
that if the property holds for the smaller (abstract) network, it holds
for the original as well. The over-approximation may be too coarse, in
which case the underlying veriﬁcation tool might return a spurious counterexample. Under such conditions, we perform counterexample-guided
reﬁnement to adjust the approximation, and then repeat the process.
Our approach is orthogonal to, and can be integrated with, many existing veriﬁcation techniques. For evaluation purposes, we integrate it with
the recently proposed Marabou framework, and observe a signiﬁcant
improvement in Marabou’s performance. Our experiments demonstrate
the great potential of our approach for verifying larger neural networks.

1

Introduction

Machine programming (MP), the automatic generation of software, is showing
early signs of fundamentally transforming the way software is developed [15]. A
key ingredient employed by MP is the deep neural network (DNN), which has
emerged as an eﬀective means to semi-autonomously implement many complex
software systems. DNNs are artifacts produced by machine learning: a user provides examples of how a system should behave, and a machine learning algorithm
generalizes these examples into a DNN capable of correctly handling inputs that
it had not seen before. Systems with DNN components have obtained unprecedented results in ﬁelds such as image recognition [24], game playing [33], natural
language processing [16], computer networks [28], and many others, often surpassing the results obtained by similar systems that have been carefully handcrafted. It seems evident that this trend will increase and intensify, and that
DNN components will be deployed in various safety-critical systems [3,19].
c The Author(s) 2020
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DNNs are appealing in that (in some cases) they are easier to create than
handcrafted software, while still achieving excellent results. However, their usage
also raises a challenge when it comes to certiﬁcation. Undesired behavior has
been observed in many state-of-the-art DNNs. For example, in many cases slight
perturbations to correctly handled inputs can cause severe errors [26,35]. Because
many practices for improving the reliability of hand-crafted code have yet to
be successfully applied to DNNs (e.g., code reviews, coding guidelines, etc.), it
remains unclear how to overcome the opacity of DNNs, which may limit our
ability to certify them before they are deployed.
To mitigate this, the formal methods community has begun developing techniques for the formal veriﬁcation of DNNs (e.g., [10,17,20,37]). These techniques
can automatically prove that a DNN always satisﬁes a prescribed property.
Unfortunately, the DNN veriﬁcation problem is computationally diﬃcult (e.g.,
NP-complete, even for simple speciﬁcations and networks [20]), and becomes
exponentially more diﬃcult as network sizes increase. Thus, despite recent
advances in DNN veriﬁcation techniques, network sizes remain a severely limiting
factor.
In this work, we propose a technique by which the scalability of many existing veriﬁcation techniques can be signiﬁcantly increased. The idea is to apply
the well-established notion of abstraction and reﬁnement [6]: replace a network
N that is to be veriﬁed with a much smaller, abstract network, N̄ , and then
verify this N̄ . Because N̄ is smaller it can be veriﬁed more eﬃciently; and it is
constructed in such a way that if it satisﬁes the speciﬁcation, the original network N also satisﬁes it. In the case that N̄ does not satisfy the speciﬁcation, the
veriﬁcation procedure provides a counterexample x. This x may be a true counterexample demonstrating that the original network N violates the speciﬁcation,
or it may be spurious. If x is spurious, the network N̄ is reﬁned to make it more
accurate (and slightly larger), and then the process is repeated. A particularly
useful variant of this approach is to use the spurious x to guide the reﬁnement
process, so that the reﬁnement step rules out x as a counterexample. This variant, known as counterexample-guided abstraction reﬁnement (CEGAR) [6], has
been successfully applied in many veriﬁcation contexts.
As part of our technique we propose a method for abstracting and reﬁning
neural networks. Our basic abstraction step merges two neurons into one, thus
reducing the overall number of neurons by one. This basic step can be repeated
numerous times, signiﬁcantly reducing the network size. Conversely, reﬁnement
is performed by splitting a previously merged neuron in two, increasing the
network size but making it more closely resemble the original. A key point is
that not all pairs of neurons can be merged, as this could result in a network
that is smaller but is not an over-approximation of the original. We resolve
this by ﬁrst transforming the original network into an equivalent network where
each node belongs to one of four classes, determined by its edge weights and its
eﬀect on the network’s output; merging neurons from the same class can then be
done safely. The actual choice of which neurons to merge or split is performed
heuristically. We propose and discuss several possible heuristics.
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For evaluation purposes, we implemented our approach as a Python framework that wraps the Marabou veriﬁcation tool [22]. We then used our framework
to verify properties of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS Xu) set
of benchmarks [20]. Our results strongly demonstrate the potential usefulness of
abstraction in enhancing existing veriﬁcation schemes: speciﬁcally, in most cases
the abstraction-enhanced Marabou signiﬁcantly outperformed the original. Further, in most cases the properties in question could indeed be shown to hold or
not hold for the original DNN by verifying a small, abstract version thereof.
To summarize, our contributions are: (i) we propose a general framework
for over-approximating and reﬁning DNNs; (ii) we propose several heuristics for
abstraction and reﬁnement, to be used within our general framework; and (iii)
we provide an implementation of our technique that integrates with the Marabou
veriﬁcation tool and use it for evaluation. Our code is available online [9].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we provide a brief
background on neural networks and their veriﬁcation. In Sect. 3, we describe our
general framework for abstracting an reﬁning DNNs. In Sect. 4, we discuss how
to apply these abstraction and reﬁnement steps as part of a CEGAR procedure,
followed by an evaluation in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we discuss related work, and we
conclude in Sect. 7.

2
2.1

Background
Neural Networks

A neural network consists of an input layer, an output layer, and one or more
intermediate layers called hidden layers. Each layer is a collection of nodes, called
neurons. Each neuron is connected to other neurons by one or more directed
edges. In a feedforward neural network, the neurons in the ﬁrst layer receive input
data that sets their initial values. The remaining neurons calculate their values
using the weighted values of the neurons that they are connected to through
edges from the preceding layer (see Fig. 1). The output layer provides the resulting value of the DNN for a given input.
There are many types of DNNs, which may diﬀer in the way their neuron values are computed. Typically, a neuron is evaluated by ﬁrst computing
a weighted sum of the preceding layer’s neuron values according to the edge
weights, and then applying an activation function to this weighted sum [13]. We
focus here on the Rectiﬁed Linear Unit (ReLU) activation function [29], given as
ReLU(x) = max (0, x). Thus, if the weighted sum computation yields a positive
value, it is kept; and otherwise, it is replaced by zero.
More formally, given a DNN N , we use n to denote the number of layers
of N . We denote the number of nodes of layer i by si . Layers 1 and n are the
input and output layers, respectively. Layers 2, . . . , n − 1 are the hidden layers.
We denote the value of the j-th node of layer i by vi,j , and denote the column
vector [vi,1 , . . . , vi,si ]T as Vi .
Evaluating N is performed by calculating Vn for a given input assignment
V1 . This is done by sequentially computing Vi for i = 2, 3, . . . , n, each time using
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Fig. 1. A fully connected, feedforward DNN with 5 input nodes (in orange), 5 output
nodes (in purple), and 4 hidden layers containing a total of 36 hidden nodes (in blue).
Each edge is associated with a weight value (not depicted). (Color ﬁgure online)

the values of Vi−1 to compute weighted sums, and then applying the ReLU
activation functions. Speciﬁcally, layer i (for i > 1) is associated with a weight
matrix Wi of size si × si−1 and a bias vector Bi of size si . If i is a hidden layer,
its values are given by Vi = ReLU(Wi Vi−1 + Bi ), where the ReLUs are applied
element-wise; and the output layer is given by Vn = Wn Vn−1 + Bn (ReLUs are
not applied). Without loss of generality, in the rest of the paper we assume that
all bias values are 0, and can be ignored. This rule is applied repeatedly once for
each layer, until Vn is eventually computed.
We will sometimes use the notation w(vi,j , vi+1,k ) to refer to the entry of
Wi+1 that represents the weight of the edge between neuron j of layer i and
neuron k of layer i + 1. We will also refer to such an edge as an outgoing edge
for vi,j , and as an incoming edge for vi+1,k .
As part of our abstraction framework, we will sometimes need to consider a
suﬃx of a DNN, in which the ﬁrst layers of the DNN are omitted. For 1 < i < n,
we use N [i] to denote the DNN comprised of layers i, i + 1, . . . , n of the original
network. The sizes and weights of the remaining layers are unchanged, and layer
i of N is treated as the input layer of N [i] .
Figure 2 depicts a small neural network. The network has n = 3 layers, of sizes
s1 = 1, s2 = 2 and s3 = 1. Its weights are w(v1,1 , v2,1 ) = 1, w(v1,1 , v2,2 ) = −1,
w(v2,1 , v3,1 ) = 1 and w(v2,2 , v3,1 ) = 2. For input v1,1 = 3, node v2,1 evaluates to
3 and node v2,2 evaluates to 0, due to the ReLU activation function. The output
node v3,1 then evaluates to 3.
2.2

Neural Network Verification

DNN veriﬁcation amounts to answering the following question: given a DNN N ,
which maps input vector x to output vector y, and predicates P and Q, does
there exist an input x0 such that P (x0 ) and Q(N (x0 )) both hold? In other words,
the veriﬁcation process determines whether there exists a particular input that
meets the input criterion P , and that is mapped to an output that meets the
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Fig. 2. A simple feedforward neural network.

output criterion Q. We refer to N, P, Q as the veriﬁcation query. As is usual
in veriﬁcation, Q represents the negation of the desired property. Thus, if the
query is unsatisﬁable (UNSAT), the property holds; and if it is satisﬁable (SAT),
then x0 constitutes a counterexample to the property in question.
Diﬀerent veriﬁcation approaches may diﬀer in (i) the kinds of neural networks
they allow (speciﬁcally, the kinds of activation functions in use); (ii) the kinds
of input properties; and (iii) the kinds of output properties. For simplicity, we
focus on networks that employ the ReLU activation function. In addition, our
input properties will be conjunctions of linear constraints on the input values.
Finally, we will assume that our networks have a single output node y, and
that the output property is y > c for a given constant c. We stress that these
restrictions are for the sake of simplicity. Many properties of interest, including
those with arbitrary Boolean structure and involving multiple neurons, can be
reduced into the above single-output setting by adding a few neurons that encode
the Boolean structure [20,32]; see Fig. 3 for an example. The number of neurons
to be added is typically negligible when compared to the size of the DNN. In
particular, this is true for the ACAS Xu family of benchmarks [20], and also
for adversarial robustness queries that use the L∞ or the L1 norm as a distance
metric [5,14,21]. Additionally, other piecewise-linear activation functions, such
as max-pooling layers, can also be encoded using ReLUs [5].
Several techniques have been proposed for solving the aforementioned veriﬁcation problem in recent years (Sect. 6 includes a brief overview). Our abstraction technique is designed to be compatible with most of these techniques, by
simplifying the network being veriﬁed, as we describe next.

3

Network Abstraction and Refinement

Because the complexity of verifying a neural network is strongly connected to
its size [20], our goal is to transform a veriﬁcation query ϕ1 = N, P, Q into
query ϕ2 = N̄ , P, Q, such that the abstract network N̄ is signiﬁcantly smaller
than N (notice that properties P and Q remain unchanged). We will construct
N̄ so that it is an over-approximation of N , meaning that if ϕ2 is UNSAT then
ϕ1 is also UNSAT. More speciﬁcally, since our DNNs have a single output, we can
regard N (x) and N̄ (x) as real values for every input x. To guarantee that ϕ2
over-approximates ϕ1 , we will make sure that for every x, N (x) ≤ N̄ (x); and
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Fig. 3. Reducing a complex property to the y > 0 form. For the network on the left
hand side, suppose we wish to examine the property y2 > y1 ∨ y2 > y3 , which is a
property that involves multiple outputs and includes a disjunction. We do this (right
hand side network) by adding two neurons, t1 and t2 , such that t1 = ReLU(y2 − y1 )
and t2 = ReLU(y2 − y3 ). Thus, t1 > 0 if and only if the ﬁrst disjunct, y2 > y1 , holds;
and t2 > 0 if and only if the second disjunct, y2 > y3 , holds. Finally, we add a neuron
z1 such that z1 = t1 + t2 . It holds that z1 > 0 if and only if t1 > 0 ∨ t2 > 0. Thus, we
have reduced the complex property into an equivalent property in the desired form.

thus, N̄ (x) ≤ c =⇒ N (x) ≤ c. Because our output properties always have the
form N (x) > c, it is indeed the case that if ϕ2 is UNSAT, i.e. N̄ (x) ≤ c for all x,
then N (x) ≤ c for all x and so ϕ1 is also UNSAT. We now propose a framework
for generating various N̄ s with this property.
3.1

Abstraction

We seek to deﬁne an abstraction operator that removes a single neuron from the
network, by merging it with another neuron. To do this, we will ﬁrst transform
N into an equivalent network, whose neurons have properties that will facilitate
their merging. Equivalent here means that for every input vector, both networks
produce the exact same output. First, each hidden neuron vi,j of our transformed
network will be classiﬁed as either a pos neuron or a neg neuron. A neuron is
pos if all the weights on its outgoing edges are positive, and is neg if all those
weights are negative. Second, orthogonally to the pos/neg classiﬁcation, each
hidden neuron will also be classiﬁed as either an inc neuron or a dec neuron.
vi,j is an inc neuron of N if, when we look at N [i] (where vi,j is an input
neuron), increasing the value of vi,j increases the value of the network’s output.
Formally, vi,j is inc if for every two input vectors x1 and x2 where x1 [k] = x2 [k]
for k = j and x1 [j] > x2 [j], it holds that N [i] (x1 ) > N [i] (x2 ). A dec neuron is
deﬁned symmetrically, so that decreasing the value of x[j] increases the output.
We ﬁrst describe this transformation (an illustration of which appears in Fig. 4),
and later we explain how it ﬁts into our abstraction framework.
Our ﬁrst step is to transform N into a new network, N  , in which every hidden
neuron is classiﬁed as pos or neg. This transformation is done by replacing each
+
−
and vi,j
, which are respectively pos
hidden neuron vij with two neurons, vi,j
+
−
and neg. Both vi,j an vi,j retain a copy of all incoming edges of the original
+
−
vi,j ; however, vi,j
retains just the outgoing edges with positive weights, and vi,j
retains just those with negative weights. Outgoing edges with negative weights
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+
are removed from vi,j
by setting their weights to 0, and the same is done for
−
outgoing edges with positive weights for vi,j
. Formally, for every neuron vi−1,p ,
−
w (vi−1,p , vi,j
) = w(vi−1,p , vi,j )

+
) = w(vi−1,p , vi,j ),
w (vi−1,p , vi,j

where w represents the weights in the new network N  . Also, for every neuron
vi+1,q

w(vi,j , vi+1,q ) w(vi,j , vi+1,q ) ≥ 0
 +
w (vi,j , vi+1,q ) =
0
otherwise
and
w



−
(vi,j
, vi+1,q )


w(vi,j , vi+1,q ) w(vi,j , vi+1,q ) ≤ 0
=
0
otherwise

(see Fig. 4). This operation is performed once for every hidden neuron of N ,
resulting in a network N  that is roughly double the size of N . Observe that N 
is indeed equivalent to N , i.e. their outputs are always identical.
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Fig. 4. Classifying neurons as pos/neg and inc/dec. In the initial network (left), the
neurons of the second hidden layer are already classiﬁed: + and − superscripts indicate
pos and neg neurons, respectively; the I superscript and green background indicate
inc, and the D superscript and red background indicate dec. Classifying node v1,1
+
−
is done by ﬁrst splitting it into two nodes v1,1
and v1,1
(middle). Both nodes have
identical incoming edges, but the outgoing edges of v1,1 are partitioned between them,
+
is split once
according to the sign of each edge’s weight. In the last network (right), v1,1
more, into an inc node with outgoing edges only to other inc nodes, and a dec node
with outgoing edges only to other dec nodes. Node v1,1 is thus transformed into three
nodes, each of which can ﬁnally be classiﬁed as inc or dec. Notice that in the worst
case, each node is split into four nodes, although for v1,1 three nodes were enough.

Our second step is to alter N  further, into a new network N  , where every
hidden neuron is either inc or dec (in addition to already being pos or neg).
Generating N  from N  is performed by traversing the layers of N  backwards,
each time handling a single layer and possibly doubling its number of neurons:
– Initial step: the output layer has a single neuron, y. This neuron is an inc
node, because increasing its value will increase the network’s output value.
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– Iterative step: observe layer i, and suppose the nodes of layer i + 1 have
+
in
already been partitioned into inc and dec nodes. Observe a neuron vi,j
+
layer i which is marked pos (the case for neg is symmetrical). We replace vi,j
+,I
+,D
with two neurons vi,j
and vi,j
, which are inc and dec, respectively. Both
+,I
+
new neurons retain a copy of all incoming edges of vi,j
; however, vi,j
retains
+,D
only outgoing edges that lead to inc nodes, and vi,j retains only outgoing
edges that lead to dec nodes. Thus, for every vi−1,p and vi+1,q ,
+,I
+,D
+
+
w (vi−1,p , vi,j
) = w (vi−1,p , vi,j
),
w (vi−1,p , vi,j
) = w (vi−1,p , vi,j
)

+
w (vi,j
, vi+1,q ) if vi+1,q is inc
 +,I
w (vi,j , vi+1,q ) =
0
otherwise

+
w (vi,j
, vi+1,q ) if vi+1,q is dec
+,D
w (vi,j
, vi+1,q ) =
0
otherwise

where w represents the weights in the new network N  . We perform this
step for each neuron in layer i, resulting in neurons that are each classiﬁed
as either inc or dec.
To understand the intuition behind this classiﬁcation, recall that by our assumption all hidden nodes use the ReLU activation function, which is monotonically
+
is pos, all its outgoing edges have positive weights, and
increasing. Because vi,j
so if its assignment was to increase (decrease), the assignments of all nodes to
which it is connected in the following layer would also increase (decrease). Thus,
+,I
+
in two, and make sure one copy, vi,j
, is only connected to nodes that
we split vi,j
+,D
need to increase (inc nodes), and that the other copy, vi,j
, is only connected
+,I
to nodes that need to decrease (dec nodes). This ensures that vi,j
is itself inc,
+,D
+,I
+,D
and that vi,j is dec. Also, both vi,j and vi,j remain pos nodes, because their
outgoing edges all have positive weights.
When this procedure terminates, N  is equivalent to N  , and so also to N ;
and N  is roughly double the size of N  , and roughly four times the size of
N . Both transformation steps are only performed for hidden neurons, whereas
the input and output neurons remain unchanged. This is summarized by the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. Any DNN N can be transformed into an equivalent network N 
where each hidden neuron is pos or neg, and also inc or dec, by increasing its
number of neurons by a factor of at most 4.
Using Lemma 1, we can assume without loss of generality that the DNN
nodes in our input query ϕ1 are each marked as pos/neg and as inc/dec. We
are now ready to construct the over-approximation network N̄ . We do this by
specifying an abstract operator that merges a pair of neurons in the network
(thus reducing network size by one), and can be applied multiple times. The only
restrictions are that the two neurons being merged need to be from the same
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hidden layer, and must share the same pos/neg and inc/dec attributes. Consequently, applying abstract to saturation will result in a network with at most
4 neurons in each hidden layer, which over-approximates the original network.
This, of course, would be an immense reduction in the number of neurons for
most reasonable input networks.
The abstract operator’s behavior depends on the attributes of the neurons
being merged. For simplicity, we will focus on the pos, inc case. Let vi,j , vi,k
be two hidden neurons of layer i, both classiﬁed as pos, inc. Because layer i
is hidden, we know that layers i + 1 and i − 1 are deﬁned. Let vi−1,p and vi+1,q
denote arbitrary neurons in the preceding and succeeding layer, respectively. We
construct a network N̄ that is identical to N , except that: (i) nodes vi,j and vi,k
are removed and replaced with a new single node, vi,t ; and (ii) all edges that
touched nodes vi,j or vi,k are removed, and other edges are untouched. Finally,
we add new incoming and outgoing edges for the new node vi,t as follows:
– Incoming edges: w̄(vi−1,p , vi,t ) = max{w(vi−1,p , vi,j ), w(vi−1,p , vi,k )}
– Outgoing edges: w̄(vi,t , vi+1,q ) = w(vi,j , vi+1,q ) + w(vi,k , vi+1,q )
where w̄ represents the weights in the new network N̄ . An illustrative example
appears in Fig. 5. Intuitively, this deﬁnition of abstract seeks to ensure that
the new node vi,t always contributes more to the network’s output than the two
original nodes vi,j and vi,k —so that the new network produces a larger output
than the original for every input. By the way we deﬁned the incoming edges of
the new neuron vi,t , we are guaranteed that for every input x passed into both N
and N̄ , the value assigned to vi,t in N̄ is greater than the values assigned to both
vi,j and vi,k in the original network. This works to our advantage, because vi,j
and vi,k were both inc—so increasing their values increases the output value.
By our deﬁnition of the outgoing edges, the values of any inc nodes in layer
i + 1 increase in N̄ compared to N , and those of any dec nodes decrease. By
deﬁnition, this means that the network’s overall output increases.
The abstraction operation for the neg, inc case is identical to the one
described above. For the remaining two cases, i.e. pos, dec and neg, dec,
the max operator in the deﬁnition is replaced with a min operator.
The next lemma (proof omitted due to lack of space) justiﬁes the use of our
abstraction step, and can be applied once per each application of abstract:
Lemma 2. Let N̄ be derived from N by a single application of abstract. For
every x, it holds that N̄ (x) ≥ N (x).
3.2

Refinement

The aforementioned abstract operator reduces network size by merging neurons, but at the cost of accuracy: whereas for some input x0 the original network
returns N (x0 ) = 3, the over-approximation network N̄ created by abstract
might return N̄ (x0 ) = 5. If our goal is prove that it is never the case that
N (x) > 10, this over-approximation may be adequate: we can prove that always
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Fig. 5. Using abstract to merge pos, inc nodes. Initially (left), the three nodes v1 , v2
and v3 are separate. Next (middle), abstract merges v1 and v2 into a single node. For
the edge between x1 and the new abstract node we pick the weight 4, which is the
maximal weight among edges from x1 to v1 and v2 . Likewise, the edge between x2 and
the abstract node has weight −1. The outgoing edge from the abstract node to y has
weight 8, which is the sum of the weights of edges from v1 and v2 to y. Next, abstract
is applied again to merge v3 with the abstract node, and the weights are adjusted
accordingly (right). With every abstraction, the value of y (given as a formula at the
bottom of each DNN, where R represents the ReLU operator) increases. For example,
to see that 12R(4x1 − x2 ) ≥ 8R(4x1 − x2 ) + 4R(2x1 − 3x2 ), it is enough to see that
4R(4x1 −x2 ) ≥ 4R(2x1 −3x2 ), which holds because ReLU is a monotonically increasing
function and x1 and x2 are non-negative (being, themselves, the output of ReLU nodes).

N̄ (x) ≤ 10, and this will be enough. However, if our goal is to prove that it is
never the case that N (x) > 4, the over-approximation is inadequate: it is possible that the property holds for N , but because N̄ (x0 ) = 5 > 4, our veriﬁcation
procedure will return x0 as a spurious counterexample (a counterexample for
N̄ that is not a counterexample for N ). In order to handle this situation, we
deﬁne a reﬁnement operator, refine, that is the inverse of abstract: it transforms N̄ into yet another over-approximation, N̄  , with the property that for
every x, N (x) ≤ N̄  (x) ≤ N̄ (x). If N̄  (x0 ) = 3.5, it might be a suitable overapproximation for showing that never N (x) > 4. In this section we deﬁne the
refine operator, and in Sect. 4 we explain how to use abstract and refine as
part of a CEGAR-based veriﬁcation scheme.
Recall that abstract merges together a couple of neurons that share the
same attributes. After a series of applications of abstract, each hidden layer i
of the resulting network can be regarded as a partitioning of hidden layer i of the
original network, where each partition contains original, concrete neurons that
share the same attributes. In the abstract network, each partition is represented
by a single, abstract neuron. The weights on the incoming and outgoing edges of
this abstract neuron are determined according to the deﬁnition of the abstract
operator. For example, in the case of an abstract neuron v̄ that represents a
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set of concrete neurons {v1 , . . . , vn } all with attributes pos, inc, the weight of
each incoming edge to v̄ is given by
w̄(u, v) = max(w(u, v1 ), . . . , w(u, vn ))
where u represents a neuron that has not been abstracted yet, and w is the
weight function of the original network. The key point here is that the order of
abstract operations that merged v1 , . . . , vn does not matter—but rather, only
the fact that they are now grouped together determines the abstract network’s
weights. The following corollary, which is a direct result of Lemma 2, establishes
this connection between sequences of abstract applications and partitions:
Corollary 1. Let N be a DNN where each hidden neuron is labeled as pos/neg
and inc/dec, and let P be a partitioning of the hidden neurons of N , that only
groups together hidden neurons from the same layer that share the same labels.
Then N and P give rise to an abstract neural network N̄ , which is obtained by
performing a series of abstract operations that group together neurons according
to the partitions of P. This N̄ is an over-approximation of N .
We now deﬁne a refine operation that is, in a sense, the inverse of abstract.
refine takes as input a DNN N̄ that was generated from N via a sequence of
abstract operations, and splits a neuron from N̄ in two. Formally, the operator
receives the original network N , the partitioning P, and a ﬁner partition P  that
is obtained from P by splitting a single class in two. The operator then returns
a new abstract network, N̄  , that is the abstraction of N according to P  .
Due to Corollary 1, and because N̄ returned by refine corresponds to a
partition P  of the hidden neurons of N , it is straightforward to show that N̄ is
indeed an over-approximation of N . The other useful property that we require
is the following:
Lemma 3. Let N̄ be an abstraction of N , and let N̄  be a network obtained
from N̄ by applying a single refine step. Then for every input x it holds that
N̄ (x) ≥ N̄  (x) ≥ N (x).
The second part of the inequality, N̄  (x) ≥ N (x) holds because N̄  is an
over-approximation of N (Corollary 1). The ﬁrst part of the inequality, N̄ (x) ≥
N̄  (x), follows from the fact that N̄ (x) can be obtained from N̄  (x) by a single
application of abstract.
In practice, in order to support the reﬁnement of an abstract DNN, we
maintain the current partitioning, i.e. the mapping from concrete neurons to
the abstract neurons that represent them. Then, when an abstract neuron is
selected for reﬁnement (according to some heuristic, such as the one we propose
in Sect. 4), we adjust the mapping and use it to compute the weights of the edges
that touch the aﬀected neuron.
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A CEGAR-Based Approach

In Sect. 3 we deﬁned the abstract operator that reduces network size at the cost
of reducing network accuracy, and its inverse refine operator that increases network size and restores accuracy. Together with a black-box veriﬁcation procedure
Verify that can dispatch queries of the form ϕ = N, P, Q, these components
now allow us to design an abstraction-reﬁnement algorithm for DNN veriﬁcation,
given as Algorithm 1 (we assume that all hidden neurons in the input network
have already been marked pos/neg and inc/dec).
Algorithm 1. Abstraction-based DNN Veriﬁcation(N, P, Q)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

Use abstract to generate an initial over-approximation N̄ of N
if Verify(N̄ , P, Q) is UNSAT then
return UNSAT
else
Extract counterexample c
if c is a counterexample for N then
return SAT
else
Use refine to reﬁne N̄ into N̄ 
N̄ ← N̄ 
Goto step 2
end if
end if

Because N̄ is obtained via applications of abstract and refine, the soundness of the underlying Verify procedure, together with Lemmas 2 and 3, guarantees the soundness of Algorithm 1. Further, the algorithm always terminates:
this is the case because all the abstract steps are performed ﬁrst, followed by a
sequence of refine steps. Because no additional abstract operations are performed beyond Step 1, after ﬁnitely many refine steps N̄ will become identical
to N , at which point no spurious counterexample will be found, and the algorithm will terminate with either SAT or UNSAT. Of course, termination is only
guaranteed when the underlying Verify procedure is guaranteed to terminate.
There are two steps in the algorithm that we intentionally left ambiguous:
Step 1, where the initial over-approximation is computed, and Step 9, where the
current abstraction is reﬁned due to the discovery of a spurious counterexample.
The motivation was to make Algorithm 1 general, and allow it to be customized
by plugging in diﬀerent heuristics for performing Steps 1 and 9, which may
depend on the problem at hand. Below we propose a few such heuristics.
4.1

Generating an Initial Abstraction

The most naı̈ve way to generate the initial abstraction is to apply the abstract
operator to saturation. As previously discussed, abstract can merge together
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any pair of hidden neurons from a given layer that share the same attributes.
Since there are four possible attribute combinations, this will result in each
hidden layer of the network having four neurons or fewer. This method, which
we refer to as abstraction to saturation, produces the smallest abstract networks
possible. The downside is that, in some case, these networks might be too coarse,
and might require multiple rounds of reﬁnement before a SAT or UNSAT answer
can be reached.
A diﬀerent heuristic for producing abstractions that may require fewer
reﬁnement steps is as follows. First, we select a ﬁnite set of input points,
X = {x1 , . . . , xn }, all of which satisfy the input property P . These points can be
generated randomly, or according to some coverage criterion of the input space.
The points of X are then used as indicators in estimating when the abstraction
has become too coarse: after every abstraction step, we check whether the property still holds for x1 , . . . , xn , and stop abstracting if this is not the case. The
exact technique, which we refer to as indicator-guided abstraction, appears in
Algorithm 2, which is used to perform Step 1 of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2. Indicator-Guided Abstraction(N, P, Q, X)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:

N̄ ← N
while ∀x ∈ X. N̄ (x) satisﬁes Q and there are still neurons that can be merged do
Δ ← ∞, bestPair ← ⊥
for every pair of hidden neurons vi,j , vi,k with identical attributes do
m←0
for every node vi−1,p do
a ← w̄(vi−1,p , vi,j ), b ← w̄(vi−1,p , vi,k )
if |a − b| > m then
m ← |a − b|
end if
end for
if m < Δ then
Δ ← m, bestPair ← vi,j , vi,k 
end if
end for
Use abstract to merge the nodes of bestPair, store the result in N̄
end while
return N̄

Another point that is addressed by Algorithm 2, besides how many rounds of
abstraction should be performed, is which pair of neurons should be merged in
every application of abstract. This, too, is determined heuristically. Since any
pair of neurons that we pick will result in the same reduction in network size, our
strategy is to prefer neurons that will result in a more accurate approximation.
Inaccuracies are caused by the max and min operators within the abstract
operator: e.g., in the case of max , every pair of incoming edges with weights
a, b are replaced by a single edge with weight max (a, b). Our strategy here is to

56

Y. Y. Elboher et al.

merge the pair of neurons for which the maximal value of |a − b| (over all incoming edges with weights a and b) is minimal. Intuitively, this leads to max (a, b)
being close to both a and b—which, in turn, leads to an over-approximation
network that is smaller than the original, but is close to it weight-wise. We point
out that although repeatedly exploring all pairs (line 4) may appear costly, in
our experiments the time cost of this step was negligible compared to that of the
veriﬁcation queries that followed. Still, if this step happens to become a bottleneck, it is possible to adjust the algorithm to heuristically sample just some of
the pairs, and pick the best pair among those considered—without harming the
algorithm’s soundness.
As a small example, consider the network depicted on the left hand side
of Fig. 5. This network has three pairs of neurons that can be merged using
abstract (any subset of {v1 , v2 , v3 }). Consider the pair v1 , v2 : the maximal value
of |a − b| for these neurons is max (|1 − 4)|, |(−2) − (−1)|) = 3. For pair v1 , v3 ,
the maximal value is 1; and for pair v2 , v3 the maximal value is 2. According to
the strategy described in Algorithm 2, we would ﬁrst choose to apply abstract
on the pair with the minimal maximal value, i.e. on the pair v1 , v3 .
4.2

Performing the Refinement Step

A reﬁnement step is performed when a spurious counterexample x has been
found, indicating that the abstract network is too coarse. In other words, our
abstraction steps, and speciﬁcally the max and min operators that were used
to select edge weights for the abstract neurons, have resulted in the abstract
network’s output being too great for input x, and we now need to reduce it.
Thus, our reﬁnement strategies are aimed at applying refine in a way that
will result in a signiﬁcant reduction to the abstract network’s output. We note
that there may be multiple options for applying refine, on diﬀerent nodes, such
that any of them would remove the spurious counterexample x from the abstract
network. In addition, it is not guaranteed that it is possible to remove x with
a single application of refine, and multiple consecutive applications may be
required.
One heuristic approach for reﬁnement follows the well-studied notion of
counterexample-guided abstraction reﬁnement [6]. Speciﬁcally, we leverage the
spurious counterexample x in order to identify a concrete neuron v, which is
currently mapped into an abstract neuron v̄, such that splitting v away from v̄
might rule out counterexample x. To do this, we evaluate the original network
on x and compute the value of v (we denote this value by v(x)), and then do
the same for v̄ in the abstract network (value denoted v̄(x)). Intuitively, a neuron pair v, v̄ for which the diﬀerence |v(x) − v̄(x)| is signiﬁcant makes a good
candidate for a reﬁnement operation that will split v away from v̄.
In addition to considering v(x) and v̄(x), we propose to also consider the
weights of the incoming edges of v and v̄. When these weights diﬀer signiﬁcantly,
this could indicate that v̄ is too coarse an approximation for v, and should be
reﬁned. We argue that by combining these two criteria—edge weight diﬀerence
between v and v̄, which is a property of the current abstraction, together with
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the diﬀerence between v(x) and v̄(x), which is a property of the speciﬁc input x,
we can identify abstract neurons that have contributed signiﬁcantly to x being
a spurious counterexample.
The reﬁnement heuristic is formally deﬁned in Algorithm 3. The algorithm
traverses the original neurons, looks for the edge weight times assignment value
that has changed the most as a result of the current abstraction, and then
performs reﬁnement on the neuron at the end of that edge. As was the case
with Algorithm 2, if considering all possible nodes turns out to be too costly,
it is possible to adjust the algorithm to explore only some of the nodes, and
pick the best one among those considered—without jeopardizing the algorithm’s
soundness.
Algorithm 3. Counterexample-Guided Reﬁnement(N, N̄ , x)
1: bestNeuron ← ⊥, m ← 0
2: for each concrete neuron vi,j of N mapped into abstract neuron v̄i,j  of N̄ do
3:
for each concrete neuron vi−1,k of N mapped into abstract neuron v̄i−1,k of N̄
do
4:
if |w(vi−1,k , vi,j ) − w̄(v̄i−1,k , v̄i,j  )| · |vi,j (x) − v̄i,j  (x)| > m then
5:
m ← |w(vi−1,k , vi,j ) − w̄(v̄i−1,k , v̄i,j  )| · |vi,j (x) − v̄i,j  (x)|
6:
bestNeuron ← vi,j
7:
end if
8:
end for
9: end for
10: Use refine to split bestNeuron from its abstract neuron

As an example, let us use Algorithm 3 to choose a reﬁnement step for the
right hand side network of Fig. 5, for a spurious counterexample x1 , x2  = 1, 0.
For this input, the original neurons’ evaluation is v1 = 1, v2 = 4 and v3 = 2,
whereas the abstract neuron that represents them evaluates to 4. Suppose v1
is considered ﬁrst. In the abstract network, w̄(x1 , v¯1 ) = 4 and w̄(x2 , v¯1 ) = −1;
whereas in the original network, w(x1 , v1 ) = 1 and w(x2 , v1 ) = −2. Thus, the
largest value m computed for v1 is |w(x1 , v1 ) − w̄(x1 , v¯1 )| · |4 − 1| = 3 · 3 = 9.
This value of m is larger than the one computed for v2 (0) and for v3 (4), and
so v1 is selected for the reﬁnement step. After this step is performed, v2 and v3
are still mapped to a single abstract neuron, whereas v1 is mapped to a separate
neuron in the abstract network.

5

Implementation and Evaluation

Our implementation of the abstraction-reﬁnement framework includes modules
that read a DNN in the NNet format [19] and a property to be veriﬁed, create
an initial abstract DNN as described in Sect. 4, invoke a black-box veriﬁcation
engine, and perform reﬁnement as described in Sect. 4. The process terminates
when the underlying engine returns either UNSAT, or an assignment that is a
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true counterexample for the original network. For experimentation purposes, we
integrated our framework with the Marabou DNN veriﬁcation engine [22]. Our
implementation and benchmarks are publicly available online [9].
Our experiments included verifying several properties of the 45 ACAS
ψ
Xu DNNs for airborne collision avoidvown
vint
ance [19,20]. ACAS Xu is a system
designed to produce horizontal turning
ρ Intruder
advisories for an unmanned aircraft (the
ownship), with the purpose of preventOwnship
ing a collision with another nearby airθ
craft (the intruder ). The ACAS Xu system receive as input sensor readings,
indicating the location of the intruder Fig. 6. (From [20]) An illustration of the
sensor readings passed as input to the
relative to the ownship, the speeds of
ACAS Xu DNNs.
the two aircraft, and their directions
(see Fig. 6). Based on these readings, it selects one of 45 DNNs, to which the
readings are then passed as input. The selected DNN then assigns scores to ﬁve
output neurons, each representing a possible turning advisory: strong left, weak
left, strong right, weak right, or clear-of-conﬂict (the latter indicating that it is
safe to continue along the current trajectory). The neuron with the lowest score
represents the selected advisory. We veriﬁed several properties of these DNNs
based on the list of properties that appeared in [20]—speciﬁcally focusing on
properties that ensure that the DNNs always advise clear-of-conﬂict for distant
intruders, and that they are robust to (i.e., do not change their advisories in the
presence of) small input perturbations.
Each of the ACAS Xu DNNs has 300 hidden nodes spread across 6 hidden layers, leading to 1200 neurons when the transformation from Sect. 3.1 is
applied. In our experiments we set out to check whether the abstraction-based
approach could indeed prove properties of the ACAS Xu networks on abstract
networks that had signiﬁcantly fewer neurons than the original ones. In addition,
we wished to compare the proposed approaches for generating initial abstractions
(the abstraction to saturation approach versus the indicator-guided abstraction
described in Algorithm 2), in order to identify an optimal conﬁguration for our
tool. Finally, once the optimal conﬁguration has been identiﬁed, we used it to
compare our tool’s performance to that of vanilla Marabou. The results are
described next.
Figure 7 depicts a comparison of the two approaches for generating initial
abstractions: the abstraction to saturation scheme (x axis), and the indicatorguided abstraction scheme described in Algorithm 2 (y axis). Each experiment
included running our tool twice on the same benchmark (network and property),
with an identical conﬁguration except for the initial abstraction being used. The
plot depicts the total time (log-scale, in seconds, with a 20-h timeout) spent by
Marabou solving veriﬁcation queries as part of the abstraction-reﬁnement procedure. It shows that, in contrast to our intuition, abstraction to saturation almost
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always outperforms the indicator-guided approach. This is perhaps due to the
fact that, although it might entail additional rounds of reﬁnement, the abstraction to saturation approach tends to produce coarse veriﬁcation queries that
are easily solved by Marabou, resulting in an overall improved performance. We
thus conclude that, at least in the ACAS Xu case, the abstraction to saturation
approach is superior to that of indicator-guided abstraction.
This experiment also conﬁrms that properties can indeed be proved on
abstract networks that are signiﬁcantly smaller than the original—i.e., despite
the initial 4x increase in network size due to the preprocessing phase, the ﬁnal
abstract network on which our abstraction-enhanced approach could solve the
query was usually substantially smaller than the original network. Speciﬁcally,
among the abstraction to saturation experiments that terminated, the ﬁnal network on which the property was shown to be SAT or UNSAT had an average size
of 268.8 nodes, compared to the original 310—a 13% reduction. Because DNN
veriﬁcation becomes exponentially more diﬃcult as the network size increases,
this reduction is highly beneﬁcial.

Fig. 7. Generating initial abstractions using abstraction to saturation and indicatorguided abstraction.

Next, we compared our abstraction-enhanced Marabou (in abstraction to saturation mode) to the vanilla version. The plot in Fig. 8 compares the total query
solving time of vanilla Marabou (y axis) to that of our approach (x axis). We ran
the tools on 90 ACAS Xu benchmarks (2 properties, checked on each of the 45
networks), with a 20-h timeout. We observe that the abstraction-enhanced version signiﬁcantly outperforms vanilla Marabou on average—often solving queries
orders-of-magnitude more quickly, and timing out on fewer benchmarks. Specifically, the abstraction-enhanced version solved 58 instances, versus 35 solved
by Marabou. Further, over the instances solved by both tools, the abstractionenhanced version had a total query median runtime of 1045 s, versus 63671 s

60

Y. Y. Elboher et al.

for Marabou. Interestingly, the average size of the abstract networks for which
our tool was able to solve the query was 385 nodes—which is an increase compared to the original 310 nodes. However, the improved runtimes demonstrate
that although these networks were slightly larger, they were still much easier
to verify, presumably because many of the network’s original neurons remained
abstracted away.

Fig. 8. Comparing the run time (in seconds, logscale) of vanilla Marabou and the
abstraction-enhanced version on the ACAS Xu benchmarks.

Finally, we used our abstraction-enhanced Marabou to verify adversarial
robustness properties [35]. Intuitively, an adversarial robustness property states
that slight input perturbations cannot cause sudden spikes in the network’s output. This is desirable because such sudden spikes can lead to misclassiﬁcation of
inputs. Unlike the ACAS Xu domain-speciﬁc properties [20], whose formulation
required input from human experts, adversarial robustness is a universal property, desirable for every DNN. Consequently it is easier to formulate, and has
received much attention (e.g., [2,10,20,36]).
In order to formulate adversarial robustness properties for the ACAS Xu
networks, we randomly sampled the ACAS Xu DNNs to identify input points
where the selected output advisory, indicated by an output neuron yi , received
a much lower score than the second-best advisory, yj (recall that the advisory
with the lowest score is selected). For such an input point x0 , we then posed the
veriﬁcation query: does there exist a point x that is close to x0 , but for which yj
receives a lower score than yi ? Or, more formally: (x − x0 L∞ ≤ δ) ∧ (yj ≤ yi ).
If this query is SAT then there exists an input x whose distance to x0 is at most
δ, but for which the network assigns a better (lower) score to advisory yj than
to yi . However, if this query is UNSAT, no such point x exists. Because we select
point x0 such that yi is initially much smaller than yj , we expect the query to
be UNSAT for small values of δ.
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For each of the 45 ACAS Xu networks, we created robustness queries for
20 distinct input points—producing a total of 900 veriﬁcation queries (we arbitrarily set δ = 0.1). For each of these queries we compared the runtime of
vanilla Marabou to that of our abstraction-enhanced version (with a 20-h timeout). The results are depicted in Fig. 9. Vanilla Marabou was able to solve more
instances—893 out of 900, versus 805 that the abstraction-enhanced version was
able to solve. However, on the vast majority of the remaining experiments, the
abstraction-enhanced version was signiﬁcantly faster, with a total query median
runtime of only 0.026 s versus 15.07 s in the vanilla version (over the 805 benchmarks solved by both tools). This impressive 99% improvement in performance
highlights the usefulness of our approach also in the context of adversarial robustness. In addition, over the solved benchmarks, the average size of the abstract
networks for which our tool was able to solve the query was 104.4 nodes, versus
310 nodes in each of the original networks—a 66% reduction in size. This reinforces our statement that, in many cases, DNNs contain a great deal of unneeded
neurons, which can safely be removed by the abstraction process for the purpose
of veriﬁcation.

Fig. 9. Comparing the run time (seconds, logscale) of vanilla Marabou and the
abstraction-enhanced version on the ACAS Xu adversarial robustness properties.

6

Related Work

In recent years, multiple schemes have been proposed for the veriﬁcation of neural networks. These include SMT-based approaches, such as Marabou [22,23],
Reluplex [20], DLV [17] and others; approaches based on formulating the problem as a mixed integer linear programming instance (e.g., [4,7,8,36]); approaches
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that use sophisticated symbolic interval propagation [37], or abstract interpretation [10]; and others (e.g., [1,18,25,27,30,38,39]). These approaches have been
applied in a variety of tasks, such as measuring adversarial robustness [2,17],
neural network simpliﬁcation [11], neural network modiﬁcation [12], and many
others (e.g., [23,34]). Our approach can be integrated with any sound and complete solver as its engine, and then applied towards any of the aforementioned
tasks. Incomplete solvers could also be used and might aﬀord better performance,
but this could result in our approach also becoming incomplete.
Some existing DNN veriﬁcation techniques incorporate abstraction elements.
In [31], the authors use abstraction to over-approximate the Sigmoid activation
function with a collection of rectangles. If the abstract veriﬁcation query they
produce is UNSAT, then so is the original. When a spurious counterexample is
found, an arbitrary reﬁnement step is performed. The authors report limited
scalability, tackling only networks with a few dozen neurons. Abstraction techniques also appear in the AI2 approach [10], but there it is the input property and reachable regions that are over-approximated, as opposed to the DNN
itself. Combining this kind of input-focused abstraction with our network-focused
abstraction is an interesting avenue for future work.

7

Conclusion

With deep neural networks becoming widespread and with their forthcoming
integration into safety-critical systems, there is an urgent need for scalable techniques to verify and reason about them. However, the size of these networks
poses a serious challenge. Abstraction-based techniques can mitigate this diﬃculty, by replacing networks with smaller versions thereof to be veriﬁed, without
compromising the soundness of the veriﬁcation procedure. The abstraction-based
approach we have proposed here can provide a signiﬁcant reduction in network
size, thus boosting the performance of existing veriﬁcation technology.
In the future, we plan to continue this work along several axes. First, we
intend to investigate reﬁnement heuristics that can split an abstract neuron
into two arbitrary sized neurons. In addition, we will investigate abstraction
schemes for networks that use additional activation functions, beyond ReLUs.
Finally, we plan to make our abstraction scheme parallelizable, allowing users to
use multiple worker nodes to explore diﬀerent combinations of abstraction and
reﬁnement steps, hopefully leading to faster convergence.
Acknowledgements. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. This project was partially supported by grants from the Binational Science
Foundation (2017662) and the Israel Science Foundation (683/18).
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